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Social inequality and mobility in
history: introduction
MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN*
The processes by which social inequality is transmitted from one gener-
ation to the next are important for all societies. Notions of how ‘open’ a
society is strongly legitimize or delegitimize its social and political order.
In a fully open society each individual will achieve as much as his or her
talent allows, without being stopped short by ‘ inherited’ inequalities,
most notably social background. Societies open to ‘talent’ are better
geared for innovation and economic growth, and we are inclined to think
of them as fairer than societies that block the social ascent of their tal-
ented members in favour of inherited positions. Fully open or merito-
cratic societies do not exist, but some societies and some periods are more
open than others. Has there been a trend towards more social mobility in
all or some parts of the world? That is a fundamental question for soci-
ology and social history. Many historians and sociologists think that there
is a trend away from traditional societies, where a person’s social position
was essentially inherited, to more open ones, where social position de-
pends upon individual achievement. Is there a convergence in levels of
mobility between parts of the world? If so, where and when did those
trends start? And what were the determinants of social mobility in the
various regions and historical periods?
Variations in mobility patterns have long since interested historians and
sociologists, from de Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Sombart, Sorokin and
the New Urban Historians to the ﬂourishing community of stratiﬁcation
sociologists today. When de Tocqueville travelled in the USA early in the
nineteenth century he noted an exceptionally high degree of mobility :
There is still a class of menials and a class of masters but these classes are not always
composed of the same individuals, still less of the same families; and those who command are
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not more secure of perpetuity than those who obey … At any moment a servant may become
a master, and he aspires to rise to that condition; the servant is therefore not a diﬀerent man
from the master.1
The contrast with Europe, in his case France, was stark, and similar
remarks were made by others, including John Stuart Mill,2 Marx,3 and
Sombart.4 As John Stuart Mill phrased it, in relation to England:
So complete, indeed, has hitherto been the separation, so strongly marked the line of
demarcation, between the diﬀerent grades of labourers, as to be almost equivalent to an
hereditary distinction of caste; each employment being chieﬂy recruited from the children
of those already employed in it, or in employments of the same rank with it in social
estimation.5
The question has received so much attention because the stakes are so
high. It is not only a core question of history, sociology and economics,
but also a subject of great social relevance. High rates of social mobility
are seen as proof of the absence of institutional barriers to each and every
individual’s use of his or her talents. If that is true, then the resulting
degree of social inequality is justiﬁed even if it is extremely high. As the
Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, put it recently in
defence of this high degree of inequality : ‘A bedrock American principle
is the idea that all individuals should have the opportunity to succeed on
the basis of their own eﬀorts, skill and ingenuity. ’ Indeed, faith in mer-
itocracy is seen as the ultimate justiﬁcation for high levels of inequality :
Although we Americans strive to provide equality of economic opportunity, we do not
guarantee equality of economic outcomes, nor should we. Indeed, without the possibility of
unequal outcomes tied to diﬀerences in eﬀort and skill, the economic incentive for productive
behavior would be eliminated, and our market-based economy – which encourages pro-
ductive activity primarily through the promise of ﬁnancial reward – would function far less
eﬀectively.’6
This is not a belief of only the high and mighty. A strikingly large pro-
portion of the American population for instance believes that they stand a
good chance of becoming upwardly mobile and rich.7 In short, there is a
widely shared opinion – at its peak probably in the USA but in much of
the rest of the world too – that a meritocracy justiﬁes both high rates of
social mobility and a great degree of social inequality. If the claim is
correct, historical, sociological and economic research will demonstrate
that few of the institutional barriers to social mobility in past societies,
which will be discussed later, are still in place.8
Here I present a short synthesis of the historical and sociological
literature that has proposed explanations for diﬀerences in social mobility
over the past three centuries. It tries to place the subsequent articles in this
special issue of Continuity and Change in a context by discussing three
forms of social mobility : intergenerational mobility (between parent and
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child) ; social homogamy and heterogamy, or mobility at marriage (mea-
sured mostly between the father of a bride and the father of her groom);
and then career mobility (taken over the course of a whole life). These
forms of social mobility are not identical and indeed they fully merit being
objects of study on their own, but they share some communalities with
regard to the forces driving them. I will pay most attention to inter-
generational mobility in history, for there is no convenient recent sum-
mary of the vast literature on its determinants, unlike in the case of social
homogamy and the history of the career. (See the surveys on social hom-
ogamy and the history of the career mentioned later.)
INTERGENERAT IONAL SOC IAL MOB IL I TY
The intellectual origins of this ﬁeld of research as we know it today can be
said to be modernization theory9 and Blau and Duncan’s status attain-
ment model.10 The latter predicts the class of destination of a son, based
only on the class of origin of his father and on the education of both
parent and child. The model has been enormously successful and is still
widely used today. In later versions the range of personal characteristics
inﬂuencing social mobility has been considerably broadened. Modern-
ization theory predicted that as societies industrialized or ‘modernized’,
employers would increasingly recruit their personnel by reference to the
individual’s merits or achievements rather than to that individual’s par-
ents (ascription). In the absence of countervailing tendencies, that leads to
a loosening of direct bonds between class of origin and of destination, a
process from ascription to achievement. In so simple and universal a form,
however, modernization theory is moribund. Historical contexts have to
be taken into account.
The earliest studies on intergenerational social mobility focused solely
on observed total mobility rates, with the number of sons who are in a
social class diﬀerent from that of their fathers expressed as a percentage of
the total number of sons.11 It soon appeared that observed total mobility
rates from the 1950s onwards diﬀered both among and within countries
and did not vary systematically with the level of industrialization. With
that knowledge, the scholarly debate has shifted to variations in relative
mobility, also termed ‘openness ’ or ‘ﬂuidity’. Openness is mobility that is
not due to changes in occupational structure. Erikson and Goldthorpe
concluded that meaningful variations in relative mobility between coun-
tries are absent in the survey material, as are trends.12 Ganzeboom, Luijkx
and Treiman, however, concluded that relative mobility grows by 1 per
cent per year.13 If that is so, it will require a long time horizon to observe
such slow changes, and this can be done best by making use of long-term
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historical data. Reviews of prior work make clear that no consensus exists
about the development of social mobility over time, nor about the driving
factors between temporal and regional variation.14 To some extent that
has to do with disciplinary boundaries,15 but it is also due to the rather
small time horizon of both historical and sociological studies, and the fact
that institutional contexts have not been suﬃciently taken into consider-
ation.16
The literature shows a great variety of competing claims for determi-
nants of social mobility.17 All such determinants, derived from conﬂicting
theories, might well have been relevant at diﬀerent times and places, but at
the moment we do not know their relative importance. The single most
important thing we have learned from the historiography of social mo-
bility published over the past few decades, however, is that not only do
the personal characteristics of those who end up in a mobility table matter
but so too do the core institutions in the societies they lived in, and that
includes not just economic institutions such as guilds or industrializing
factories but trade unions too, as well as the political structure and
schools, for example.
I shall begin, however, by discussing the more salient personal charac-
teristics which have a bearing on social mobility patterns and processes
and then go on to discuss institutional contexts. In the literature on de-
terminants of social mobility, the personal characteristics that are thought
to inﬂuence social mobility most are gender, parents, siblings, education
and migration.
In pre-industrial societies girls were less likely than boys to work in the
labour market, and if they did so the range of occupations open to them
was more limited, and this is so even if we take into consideration that
there is often a signiﬁcant under-recording of female occupations in his-
torical sources. Parents tended to invest more in the education of boys, for
the rewards of male education and training were higher than those for
girls. If parents in their old age became dependent on support from their
children, it was also more proﬁtable to seek to raise the earning power of
boys. There was more volatility in the choice of occupation for daughters
than for sons. French and German autobiographies from the period of
industrialization ‘all suggest a certain contingency that governed occu-
pational choice in early adolescence. For girls especially, there seems to
have been little conscious planning, little ability to imagine occupational
futures. ’18 Sons have generally been more ‘privileged’ than girls, the more
so if the legal system (primogeniture) and cultural norms dictated it, giv-
ing of course the greatest advantage to ﬁrst-born boys over their younger
brothers. Over time one would expect the social openness of women to
have increased more than that of men, as more women entered the labour
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market, as modern bureaucratic labour markets came into existence
and as social norms and laws (including marriage bars, inheritance laws
and customs favouring the eldest male child) grew less prevalent.
Furthermore, the growth of social security schemes made parents in their
old age less dependent on their children, reducing the necessity to ensure
that at least one of the boys earned enough to help his aged parents, while
at the same time still leaving some parents dependent on the care of a
child, notably a daughter.
Parents can inﬂuence the choice of occupation of their children, by
helping them to ﬁnd a job. As well as having the right connections and
ﬁnancial resources, parents have cultural resources ; they can help their
children with reading and writing, familiarize them with a certain type of
work, and mould their children’s aspirations. Over the last decade the
eﬀect of mothers on the schooling and later the work of their children has
become a research topic in its own right.19 It appears that in contemporary
societies a mother’s occupation has an eﬀect independent of that of the
father. Miles argues that fathers are helpful in getting their sons into a job,
acting as ‘occupational brokers ’, but for girls their mothers can famil-
iarize them with a certain type of work, and use social contacts in helping
the daughter to get a job.20 Certainly for servants it has been shown that a
mother’s occupation as a servant tended to encourage a girl to become
one herself.21 Mothers with speciﬁc skills or property, such as midwives or
shopkeepers, could also transfer such livings to their daughters. For girls a
‘Cinderella eﬀect ’ has been signalled in the literature :22 in the past, if a
girl’s mother died her father often remarried quite soon and in some such
instances a girl might have wanted to get out of the house as soon as she
could, even if to do so meant rushing into an inappropriate job. Thus a
remarrying father might mean downward mobility for his daughter.
The number of siblings and one’s place in the pecking order within the
family can inﬂuence social destination. A large number of siblings means
that parents, by a process known as ‘resource dilution’, have to divide
both their dedication and their income among many children, although
they can of course favour any particular one. In some societies polygamy
is practised, increasing the number of siblings ; that might lead to further
‘resource dilution’, or perhaps to the children of the ﬁrst wife being
favoured. Small families may have been more successful in helping their
children to reach higher positions, especially in the case of small families
embracing the novel techniques of family limitation.23
Apart from siblings and parents, the resources of grandparents
are relevant too.24 Note that this relates to the impact of grandparents
over and above their indirect impact through their own child, who is
the mother or father of the subject. It is generally held that such
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multigenerational inﬂuences are weak, but in certain cases they might
make a diﬀerence, for example if a father died young, or a grandfather
possessed a certain attribute – a title or reputation – that he had not
passed on to his child, as was sometimes the case among grandfathers in
Imperial China.25
Education is important as it furnishes skills needed for particular jobs.
Not only one’s own education but that of one’s parents can be important
because well-educated parents choose better schools, help with homework
and encourage schooling. As literacy in general increases, the eﬀect of
illiteracy might tend to become greater : those who could not sign their
names for themselves in twentieth-century Europe became the truly dis-
advantaged.26
Being a migrant can inﬂuence one’s prospects of ﬁnding a job. There are
several rival explanations for this.27 Migrants might be a positive selection
from the population in general (‘ the ambitious move on’) or they could be
a negative selection – ‘a ﬂoating proletariat ’.28 In moving to a new city
they might deprive themselves of help from friends in ﬁnding a job,
especially if they belong to a disadvantaged ethnic group, but they might
proﬁt from opportunities in a new labour market which matches the skills
they can oﬀer (an argument made by de Tocqueville and others subse-
quently to explain the assumed greater openness of the USA, where new
frontiers opened up new possibilities to climb).
The eﬀect of personal characteristics on social mobility depends at least
partly on the institutional context : some societies discriminate against
girls while others stimulate their occupational rise by positive action;
whether the skills a migrant has learned prove useful depends on the nature
of those skills and also on demand in the receiving society.29 Institutional
settings are crucial. Failure to take contexts into account might be an im-
portant explanation of the often contradictory results that have been
found for determinants of mobility. The relevant institutional contexts are:
industrialization and other economic changes; educational expansion;
guilds, trade unions and other professional organizations; political
regimes; urbanization; wars; marriage bars and inheritance patterns.
Industrialization has long been the institutional context attracting
most of the attention of stratiﬁcation sociologists. Modernization theor-
ists believe there is a global historical trend towards social ‘openness’.30
Modern societies, it is argued, are both predicated upon and characterized
by their openness. The utilization of talent and the expression of pre-
ferences are free from the inhibiting forces of tradition and power diﬀer-
ences. ‘A competitive industrial system … will increase social mobility,
raising the gifted, and lucky, and lowering the inept, lazy, and ill-fortuned.
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This is the kind of thing one sees in eighteenth or nineteenth century
Germany … or in nineteenth and twentieth century Japan … or in
France … or in the India of today’.31 Although the theoretical meaning of
‘modernization’ is quite broad in the works of some authors,32 it was
often operationalized in rudimentary form as the number of steam engines
or per capita energy consumption, but that is a narrowing caused by the
relatively easy availability of such indicators and, while understandable, it
is unfortunate. Recent work on the history of the career also supports the
existence of a relationship between economic change and social mobility,33
but does not look towards industrialization, pointing instead to processes
of economic specialization and the rise of large bureaucracies with their
own internal labour regimes, such as railway companies or banks, which
select personnel through advertisements and open applications.
Another institutional context to attract attention for its inﬂuence on
social mobility is systems of education and their development, often called
‘educational expansion’. Individuals have varying degrees of schooling,
and societies diﬀer in their educational systems. Economists stress
investment by parents in human capital, as well as the progressive nature
of public investment in human capital, in other words the degree to which
children from poor families are subsidized to go to school.34 In theory,
then, the more parents or the State invest in education, the more mobility
there is. And indeed, in a meritocratic society, a son or daughter obtains a
job suited to his or her skill level, and skill levels are learned in schools.
However, the historical record might not invariably ﬁt this straight-
forward view. There is a competing opinion, one that stresses the
importance of education too, but more in the form of certiﬁcates and
diplomas which serve, rightly or wrongly, as shorthand for skill. By
‘wrongly’ is meant that, as social reproduction theory stresses, elites use
certiﬁcates to circumvent meritocracy. Collins writes that ‘the demands of
any occupational position are not ﬁxed, but represent whatever behaviour
is settled upon in bargaining between the persons who ﬁll positions and
those who attempt to control them’,35 And further that ‘education is an
artiﬁcial device for monopolizing access to lucrative positions’.36
Elites have the funds to pay the cost of their children’s attendance at
‘good’ schools – elites who do not need income from child labour and
who enjoy a way of life that better prepares children for these ‘good’
schools, for example through motivation or simply by helping with
homework. Social reproduction theorists thus diﬀer fundamentally from
meritocratic theorists with regard to the role of schooling: schooling re-
inforces and tightens class bonds through the generations, rather than
loosening them. Elites may have made more use of credentials over the
years precisely because the elites’ direct inﬂuence has eroded. Because it
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has become increasingly diﬃcult to place a child directly into a privileged
position, an indirect ‘compensation strategy’ of social reproduction is
used.37 It is not easy to distinguish between credentialist and true merito-
cratic societies. Treiman, Ganzeboom and Rijken formulate social re-
production theory in terms of trends over time:
While … equality of educational opportunity may be increasing at low levels of education,
access to universities and other elite institutions is seen as monopolized by the rich and the
powerful. Thus the claim is that the eﬀect of social origins on educational attainment is
greatest at the high end of the educational distribution. From this, it follows that, ceteris
paribus, as education expands the dependence on social origins should increase.38
They propose to deconstruct the eﬀect of the expansion of education on
social mobility within a society into a function of the level of education
in that society – where the more years of schooling a population has, the
more open it will be – and into an eﬀect of the unequal social attendance
of education: if educational inequality is higher, social closure will be
greater.
Credentialism is manifested too in the inﬂuence of guilds, professional
organizations and trade unions. In a meritocratic view of the world, such
institutions impart skills and certify to an employer that a person has what
skills are needed for a certain job. But they may also be seen as institu-
tional hindrances to newcomers. Guilds were most open to the sons of
their masters, and in any case generally open to neither women nor Jews.
Trade unions, it is often said, do most to further the interests of their
members, predominantly skilled male workers. Penn reports that in
England during the Great War a shortage of men forced both trade
unions and employers to allow women to do skilled work previously
forbidden to them because they were supposedly under-qualiﬁed, but
despite this lack of formal qualiﬁcations women managed well during the
War.39 After it, they were seen once more as unqualiﬁed and their jobs
were given back to returning servicemen. A similar situation occurred
after World War II.40
Political regimes matter in loosening or tightening the occupational
bonds between parents and children. Prime examples in the literature are
communist regimes.41 They set out to block the transmission of top pos-
itions to the children of the bourgeoisie42 while at the same time recruiting
the ‘socialist intelligentsia ’ from the rank and ﬁle.43 They intended to
provide equal opportunities through aﬃrmative action. Other ways in
which they tried to do that were by favouring students from backward
regions44 or by conﬁscating private property, which prevented people
passing assets on to the next generation.45 Income diﬀerences in commu-
nist societies narrowed. Furthermore, communist regimes in theory
favoured equal opportunities for men and women, which was sometimes
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expressed in laws or quota systems.46 Rijken reports that the gender gap in
opportunities was indeed lower under communist regimes, and that the
eﬀects of ascription were lower.47 That need not be so, either because good
intentions may be ineﬀective or because, behind the fac¸ade of equality
propaganda, communist elites, like other elites, might be expected to try
to pass their own privileged positions on to their children.48 Some studies
state that communist regimes begin by increasing occupational mobility
but, after a generation or so, revert to social reproduction – of the new
communist regimes, in their case.49
Political regimes can be divided into groups other than those deﬁned by
the dichotomy between communist and non-communist regimes.50 In a
milder form, the same theoretical arguments favouring increasing social
ﬂuidity can be made for social-democratic regimes, and perhaps in prac-
tice even more so because such regimes come to power in free elections
and so are unable to ‘hive oﬀ’ their positions of privilege or hand them
over to their children collectively. States are also major employers, so they
are able to inﬂuence occupational achievements, notably by some sort of
aﬃrmative action for groups that are underprivileged or discriminated
against. So political regimes with large public service sectors can choose to
have a positive eﬀect on openness.
The list of institutional contexts inﬂuencing intergenerational social
mobility can be expanded to include other contexts, notably urbanization,
wars, marriage bars and inheritance patterns. Cities are often believed to
loosen the bonds between parental occupations and those of their children
in several ways. Schooling as well as transport and communication
facilities are generally more developed in cities, where large bureaucratic
institutions with formal recruitment procedures ﬁrst appeared. Moreover,
cities oﬀer children more scope to escape from parental pressure,
especially if they move there from rural areas.
Wars and revolutions are social eruptions which sometimes have the
power to change established patterns of occupational choice. For men,
they have often meant geographical displacement and a fresh look at
society, including one’s own place in it. Furthermore, joining the army
could be a way for poorer children to obtain vocational training, a way
out of their social class. Since times of war drain the labour market of
young men, such times also oﬀer a window of opportunity, even if only a
small one, for women to do work previously done by men. So we expect
wars to increase social ﬂuidity, at least in the short term, and to do so
more eﬀectively for women than for men. Historically speaking, it is quite
clear that normative and legal restrictions made the choice of occupations
smaller for women than for men.51 The existence of marriage bars meant
that women had to stop working after marriage, and that certainly
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discouraged educational investment. Finally, inheritance systems might
favour the eldest son to the detriment of any other children, as with either
de jure or de facto primogeniture.
CAREER MOB IL I TY
Given the relatively large number of studies that have been written about
intergenerational mobility – meaning changes of occupation from parent
to child – one might expect a relatively large number of studies on the
changes of occupation of one person over his or her life course, referred to
as career mobility (as opposed to changes of occupation between the
generations). After all, both relate to occupational change occurring at
the same historical time, and both will be inﬂuenced by a combination of
the characteristics of the persons in question and contextual inﬂuences,
and in many cases the same personal and contextual determinants. But
such an expectation would be false. The number of studies on career
mobility, past and present, is clearly lower than that on intergenerational
mobility and fewer than the number of articles and monographs devoted
to social homogamy. In part that might be a reﬂection of the diﬃculties
faced by sociologists studying contemporary societies, and by historians
studying past populations, in ﬁnding data able to capture occupational
change among the same set of individuals over their life course. Whereas
historians may use one single marriage certiﬁcate from an abundant
amount available to them to infer both the marital and intergenerational
mobility of a person, for career mobility such a certiﬁcate is of limited use.
To study career mobility for the population at large, or at least a sizeable
share of it, one needs to link marriage and other vital registers, or to link
censuses, or to use one or more population registers and follow the per-
sons in question all the way through them. Either method requires far
more eﬀort than is usually needed to obtain the data for either inter-
generational mobility or social homogamy.
This unfortunate situation has led not only to a relative shortage of
data and empirical historical studies based on them, but also perhaps to a
paucity of theoretical claims regarding the driving forces that have shaped
careers or that have determined changes over time. These claims have
recently been summarized.52 While there is little point in repeating those
summaries here, it is worth noting that, just as in the history of inter-
generational social mobility, it is possible to distinguish two conceptually
diﬀerent sets of determinants of changes of occupation over the life
course: personal characteristics and institutional contexts.
Personal characteristics that inﬂuence career mobility include
gender, parents, siblings, education and migration, just as in the case of
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intergenerational mobility, and for much the same reasons. To give an
example relating to gender, until recently the number of diﬀerent jobs
open to women was much smaller than that for men, which was due partly
to gender inequalities in education caused by diﬀerent investments by
parents for boys and girls, partly to the demands of child care, and partly
due to contextual impediments to women in the form of policies, rules
and regulations, and the laws of unions, ﬁrms and governments.53 This
example shows that, apart from personal characteristics, contexts have
mattered in shaping careers diﬀerently between regions and periods: some
contexts discriminate against girls, others (although not many, it must be
said) stimulate their occupational rise by positive action.
As was the case with intergenerational social mobility, institutional
settings are of prime importance. Due to the relative lack of historical
studies of the career, it is not easy to be sure what constitutes the set of
relevant institutional determinants. The recent summary by Brown, Mitch
and van Leeuwen lists the following potential inﬂuences : industrializa-
tion, the rise of hierarchical bureaucratic management structures, the de-
velopment of internal labour markets, the spread of education, migration
regimes and discrimination by race, religion and sex.54 Some of them are
identical to the crucial institutional factors identiﬁed above as shaping
intergenerational social mobility.
Industrialization can be expected to have stimulated social mobility
in two ways. The ﬁrst is in an economic sense, by changing the occu-
pational structure, including the creation of new jobs needing to be
ﬁlled by persons who were mobile – in the sense of having held a diﬀerent
job or coming from a diﬀerent occupational origin. The second is in
a social and cultural sense, by whetting the appetites of employees for
occupational change and by stimulating a shift in the recruitment prac-
tices of employers, who needed to ﬁnd the best man or woman for the
new job.
The role of education appears to have been similar, certainly in the
Western world. Over the last two centuries there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of educational institutions providing, formally or
informally, the qualiﬁcations needed for a new job. Those institutions
provided universal primary schooling and an extension of secondary
and tertiary education, but notable too was the rise of organizations of
professionals to provide training, education, certiﬁcation or licensing for
chemists, notaries and medical practitioners, for example. In some ways
they resemble the ill-fated guilds that also controlled entrance to the
labour market.55 Organizations of workers, that is unions, were active
in trying to regulate the labour market in ways favourable to their mem-
bers.56
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Employers were doing the same, faced as they were with the problem of
employing and retaining qualiﬁed personnel wherever that was a positive
requirement. The rise of hierarchical bureaucratic management structures
and the development of internal labour markets from the late nineteenth
century can be seen as institutional responses to the problem.57 An inter-
nal labour market in a ﬁrm has its own set of rules and procedures to
create a structure for the career paths of its employees through clearly
deﬁned job categories, wage scales, a personnel department and, perhaps
most of all, the prospect of rising through the ranks in a clearly identiﬁ-
able, more or less predeﬁned way.
MOB IL I TY AT MARR IAGE: SOC IAL HOMOGAMY
The ﬁeld of study of mobility at marriage is usually termed ‘social hom-
ogamy’, if one marries into one’s own social class, or ‘social heterogamy’,
if one marries into a diﬀerent social class. In practice the terms are used
interchangeably with those of ‘social endogamy’ and ‘exogamy’.58
Whereas the historical study of the career is a recent idea and the number
of studies is limited, social homogamy has a venerable research tradition,
in ethnology, anthropology, sociology and history, as a recent survey
shows.59 More so than in the study of either intergenerational social mo-
bility or the history of the career, where the inﬂuence of ethnology and
anthropology is limited but that of economics more prominent, there has
been an emphasis on cultural norms shaping marriage patterns by social
class. Although it is not always phrased like that, there has often been an
emphasis on institutional determinants. A now classic way to structure the
determinants of social homogamy is to look at three clusters: individual
preferences, third-party inﬂuences and the structural constraints imposed
by the marriage market.60 While the notion of individual characteristics
inﬂuencing social mobility processes is probably somewhat broader than
that of individual preferences, as will be seen shortly, it might still be true
that in studies on social homogamy there has been a relatively greater
stress on institutional determinants.
Individual preferences may in part be seen as random (a preference for
‘ lively blue eyes’ over ‘sleepy brown eyes’, for example), or at least as
usually beyond the domain of the historian. They may also refer to the
wish to marry for love, a subject which has attracted a lot of discussion,
following Shorter’s claim that in this respect a revolution has occurred
over the past two or three centuries – at least in the Western world.61
Although romantic love can be seen as an individual preference, Shorter
presents it as a universal drive of the human heart that had been routinely
thwarted by parents, priests, mayors, neighbours and peers. When the
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authority of those forces began to be eroded and ﬁnally gave way, the
human heart could follow its romantic desires. What can be seen as an
individual preference can be seen too as a change in institutional contexts,
due to migration and urbanization, mass communication, secularization
and other factors. Another individual preference mentioned in the litera-
ture is that some, if not most, people prefer a partner who shares one’s
own values and tastes and cultural background, though they have no
objections to marrying into an economically higher class.62
Individual characteristics thought to inﬂuence inter- and intragenera-
tional mobility have included gender, parents, siblings, education and
migration, and so they diﬀer from the individual preferences thought to
shape marriage patterns by social class. While education and migration
may in part be seen as the result of an individual preference (but also as a
consequence of decisions by others, notably parents who might or might
not invest in schooling or move to another place), gender, parents and
siblings are not preferences but givens.63 That is not to say that the
literature on social homogamy has ignored those factors. On the contrary
it is often acknowledged that parents, although they seldom formally ar-
ranged marriages in the Western world, tried to inﬂuence the choices
made by their children. It has been acknowledged that having many
brothers and sisters can be harmful to one’s marital prospects, due to
resource dilution, which has been argued too for intergenerational mo-
bility, and it has been recognized as well that parents might have been
inclined to place greater emphasis on ﬁnding a suitable marriage partner
for a ﬁrst-born son than for later-born sons or for daughters. Gender,
parents, siblings, education and migration, however, are subsumed in
the other two categories of the tripartite division of determinants of social
homogamy: third-party inﬂuences and the structural constraints imposed
by the marriage market.
The third parties aﬀecting social homogamy are parents, peers and
communal authorities, and their eﬀect in the past is now generally seen as
having been considerable, especially in agricultural regions. Segalen, for
example, wrote about France:
In traditional society, problems that would today be considered personal, whether to do with
the intimacies of the heart or of the body, were the responsibility of the community. The
formation of the couple, as well as concerning the young people themselves, involved the
two families and the entire social group … Family considerations weigh heavily on the in-
dividuals, who tend to disappear in the face of the wider aims of economic and social im-
provement of the family line. In these terms the couple is merely a link in the chain leading to
the growth of patrimony or resisting the fragmentation of landholdings through inheritance.
The individuality of the couple, or rather, its tendency towards individuality, is crushed by
the family institution, and also by the social pressure exercised by the village community as a
whole.64
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Segalen also described vividly how neighbours and peers could disapprove
of certain marriage candidates, who might for example be too old or too
young, or who perhaps came from another village. Much of the historical
anthropological and ethnological literature in this respect incidentally
deals with animosity and quarrels – vile looks at communal water places,
kettle music in front of the houses of culprits, and ﬁghts – rather than
describing gentle guidance towards a suitable marriage partner, probably
because animosity and quarrelling have a greater chance of ending up in
the historical record in an archive or of being remembered by aged people
during interviews.
Institutional inﬂuences on the choice of a marriage partner are appar-
ent too in the third cluster of determinants of social homogamy: the
structural constraints of the marriage market.65 This cluster can be split in
turn into two subgroups: marriage horizons and meeting chances.
‘Marriage horizons’ are the geographical areas from which potential
spouses were drawn, whereas ‘meeting chances’ refers to the likelihood of
actually meeting a potential spouse within that area, and the factors
determining that likelihood.
Nowadays potential ‘brides ’ from exotic places can solicit marriage
partners by sending love letters and descriptions of their background,
their bodies and their intimate desires to millions of people unknown to
them all over the world, or at least the Western world. A marriage is just
one mouse click away, and if not a marriage then at least an exchange
of emails or possibly a meeting or relationship. These unsolicited emails –
and especially the more serious dating sites on the Internet – are a modern
and no doubt valuable representation of a marriage market. The problem,
if any, is adopting just a single choice amidst the abundance in the ether !
In past societies the problem was not often one of abundance. Young sons
and daughters of farmers and farmhands in particular were often faced
with a rather limited supply of potential spouses, so that one might argue
that the marriage horizon for villagers until well into the nineteenth cen-
tury was generally limited to the distance they could walk in half a day at
most, for they had to walk back as well in order to be home in good time.
While that is of course an oversimpliﬁcation – because young men and
women could decide to migrate or they might travel to fairs and young
men could be forced to move around as part of their military service, for
example – it does indicate that marriage horizons in past societies were for
many people limited to an extent that is hard for us to imagine today,
because in the course of the past two centuries horizons have widened
greatly due to the growth of mass communication (love letters) and mass
transport (air travel, railways, bicycles, trams and motor cars). Mass
communication and mass transport are, then, two institutional factors
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which, as we have seen, have also been determinants of intergenerational
social mobility.
A lot of attention has been given in studies of social homogamy to the
factors inﬂuencing the likelihood of meeting – and eventually mating
with – someone from another class within a given marriage horizon.
Factors thought to inﬂuence this likelihood are: the rise of mass edu-
cation, spatial social segregation, associational life, the rise of a modern
labour market and the degree of religious or ethnic diversity. The role of
education is in large part the same as discussed above: schools open up
other social horizons because of the proximity of potential spouses from
diﬀerent social classes, while the curriculum itself might teach youngsters
that they do not necessarily have to follow the opinions of their parents
about what constitutes a good marriage. That is of course the more true
if schools are mixed with regard to gender and social class, and it is
especially true for higher education, such as universities or vocational
training, as young people there are of marriageable age.
The degree to which diﬀerent social classes live in proximity or not is
also an important factor. Even if no adolescent or parent has any wish to
arrange marriages by social class, if they live in socially segregated towns
then there will be a tendency towards socially homogamous marriages,
because meeting chances are higher for individuals living in the same area
of a town; hence spatial social segregation will encourage marriages be-
tween members of the same social class. The same applies to the organ-
ization of associational life. Over the past two centuries in the Western
world the number of clubs and organizations has probably grown, and if,
say, a soccer club or a youth movement attracts young men and women
mainly of the same social class, then that too will create a drive towards
socially homogamous marriages. On the other hand, if associational life is
socially mixed, that will stimulate social mobility at marriage.
The penultimate factor in the list of determinants of marriage patterns
by social class discussed here is the labour market, and in particular the
rise of large ﬁrms. Bureaucracies such as banks, post oﬃces and the civil
service, as well as factories, provide not only work but also spouses.
Marriage may occur between people who have met at work, and in large
ﬁrms young men and women are presented with an opportunity to meet
each other, so the degree to which that leads to socially mixed marriages
depends on how socially mixed the workplaces are. If nearly all of those at
work are from the same social class, say in a factory, then that will lead to
social homogamy. In the reverse case it will lead to social heterogamy.
The ﬁnal determinant refers to the degree of religious or ethnic diversity
in a community, the notion being that if a community is split along both
social and religious lines, and the religious cleavages are deep, then there
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will be a drive towards socially mixed marriages. The reasoning here is
that the number of marriage partners from the same social class, that is
deemed suitable for marriage, is reduced, because some will have a re-
ligious background deemed unsuitable. In such a case most people might
give priority to marrying someone of the same faith over marrying
someone from the same social class.
CONCLUS ION
This introduction to what, according to the literature, may be seen as the
driving forces behind regional and temporal variations in social mobility
patterns has not only been short, and as a result highly stylized, but –
based as it is on the existing literature – it also has its lacunae and might
give the impression that all forms of social mobility everywhere and at all
times have had the same determinants. That would be a false impression,
or at least one that is only partially true.
The extent to which trends in the past two centuries, or diﬀerences
between regions, can be explained by the determinants that have been
discussed is an empirical question. We do not yet know what factors
prevailed in some societies and what in other societies, nor do we know
how much there will remain in each society that we cannot explain and for
which we might need either to ﬁnd new generalized explanations or to
bow our heads before the historical record and acknowledge idiosyn-
crasies.
It would be a false impression, or at least an overstated claim, in an-
other sense too. The literature on intergenerational social mobility does
not quite suggest an identical array of driving inﬂuences as does the
literature on social homogamy or career mobility does. And there is no
reason why it should, either. Following in one’s father’s footsteps or not;
embarking on new labour trajectories or receiving a gold watch at the end
of a lifetime of service to the same employer; or ﬁnding a marriage partner
from a similar or perhaps a radically diﬀerent social origin are not the
same phenomena. They can all be said to reﬂect aspects of social open-
ness, but they do so in diﬀerent ways and are in part shaped by diﬀerent
driving forces. This survey of the literature has, however, identiﬁed simi-
larities, and it remains in large measure another empirical question to
what extent the same driving forces have operated for all three forms of
mobility and to what extent the determinants were diﬀerent. One way or
another, however, institutional contexts, so it is claimed, will prove to
have been of crucial importance in shaping social mobility patterns in
history.
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